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STATEMENT OF NATURE OF CASE 
Appeal from a judgment in a divorce proceeding 
alleging improper distribution and award of equities in real 
property. 
DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT 
Appellant's Order to Show Cause seeking enforcement 
of an equity distribution under the original Decree of 
DLVorce, was heard in 1978 in the Third Judicial District 
Court before the Honorable David K. Winder. Appellant's 
appeal to this Court from an adverse Order resulted in a 
remand to the district court for further proceedings. 
From the Judgment of the Houorable Dean E. Conder 
Appellant prosecutes this appeal. 
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RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Respondent respectfully requests the Court to attire 
the judgment of the trial court and further requests an Ord;, 
directing the trial court to award attorney's fees to tnE 
Respondent as costs pursuant to Rule 68(b) of the Utah Rulu 
of Civil Procedure. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Respondent and Appellant appeared i Il the Th1rc 
Judicial District Court of Salt Lake County on April 19, 
1969, before the Honorable Alden J. Anderson for trial oa a 
divorce complaint (R24 and 25). 
During sa i<l appearance, Appellant and Respondent 
entered into an oral stipulation wherein Appellant's answer 
to the Complaint was dismissed (Rl34 Exhibit Dl, p. 2) aaa 
Respondent was granted a Decree of Divorce incorporatic6 salG 
stipulation (Rl34 Exhibit Dl, p. 6 and 7). 
The Decree of Divorce entered A pr i 1 28' 1 96 y' 
specifically provided that the real property acquired b, 
Appellant and Respondent during the course of their marrtJiE 
be distributed as follows: 
With regard to the house, it will be sold 
upon her remarriage or when the home is no longer 
needed for the minor children, at which time tbe 
home will be sold and tne equity as of the date 
of this divorce will be divided equally amon6 the 
parties with the further stipuldtion that the 
- ) -
Plaintiff shall have all of the principal payments 
made by ber after the date of tbe divorce before 
the costs of sale and tben tbe remaining equity 
will be divided equally. (R25). 
No objection to this provision was made at any time by tbe 
Respondent or his attorney. 
On June 15, 1977, an Order to Show Cause was issued 
by tbe Third Judicial District Court of Salt Lake County (R38 
and 39) based upon Appellant's Affidavit in Support of Order 
to Show Cause (R36 and 37). The Order to Show Cause issued 
at Appellant's request, sought enforcement of that provision 
cited above in the Decree of Divorce by having the home and 
real property located at 6723 South 2445 East, Salt Lake 
City, Utah sold and tbe proceeds of the sale divided equally 
between tbe Appellant and Respondent after deducting the 
balance of principal payments made by Respondent on the 
mortgage obligation subsequent to entry of the Decree of 
Divorce (R38). 
Appellant's Order to Show Cause came on for hearing 
April 14, 1978, before the Honorable David K. Winder who 
found that tbe provision cited above relating to the 
distribution of equities in the bome, although ambiguous, 
provided that the equity as of the date of the divorce would 
be the value to be divided among tbe parties (R57). The 
Lourt further found tbat the value of the home as of the date 
ot divorce was $35,000 (R57). Judge Winder, by Order dated 
May 30, 1978, directed the equity of the home be divided 
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among the par t i es by s a 1 e or by buy - out , p 1 a c in,; a $ 3 s , 11 
value on the home, minus any amount due and ow1og 00 tl.' 
principal mortga,;e as of April 28, 1969 (R62). It i... d. 
further ordered by the trial court that the sum of $2,15. 
should be subtracted from Appellant's equity award for 
delinquent child support payments ( R6 2 and 6 3) 
principal balance owing on the existing mortgage was fixed a: 
$13,963.44 as of the date of divorce, or April 28, 19,, 
(RS 5) • 
Appellant appealed the Order of Judge Winder on Juo, 
26, 1978, and the matter was designated and heard as Case t:c, 
15923 ( R64). Following oral arguments, the Order of tr" 
District Court was reversed and the case remanded for further 
proceedings by the District Court consistent with the opin10r. 
of this Court (R75). 
A hearing was held in the Third Judicial Districc 
Court in Salt Lake County before the Honorable Dean E. Conder 
on January 12, 1983. Pursuant to that hearing, the tria. 
court made certain Findings of Fact which are cited 1r. 
Appellant's Brief. Pursuant to those f ind1ngs, judt,ment 
entered on February 1 5 , 1983 , in favor of App e 11 ant in t 1" 
sum of $6,078.15 with interest at the rate of eil',ht percer.l 
(8%) from July 1, 1976 until May 13 1981, and at the rate 
t we 1 v e per cent ( 1 2 % ) f r om Hay 1 4 , 1 9 8 1 u n t i 1 t h e pr ,, 5 e 1· 
(RlOl and 102). 
Prior to entry of said judgment, Respondent 
pet1t1oned the Court for an Award Taxing Attorney's Fees as 
Costs or for Reconsideration of Judgment pursuant to Rule 
68(b) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. The trial court 
denied that Motion. 
ARGUMENT 
Point I 
THE PROVISION IN THE DECREE OF DIVORCE 
DIRECTING SALE OF THE HOME WAS RULED BY 
THE UTAH SUPREME COURT TO BE AMBIGUOUS 
AND THEREFORE UNENFORCEABLE. 
The Appellant argues that the trial court failed to 
follow the mandate of the Decree of Divorce which directed 
the sale of the home upon the remarriage of Respondent or 
when the home was no longer needed for the minor children of 
the parties. In so arguing, Appellant ignores the prior 
decisions of both trial courts and the decision of the Utah 
Supreme Court which ruled that the provision in the Decree of 
Divorce dealing with the ultimate disposition of the various 
equities in the home of the parties hopelessly ambiguous and, 
absent some further evidentiary showing of the actual intent 
>f the parties at the time of the divorce, that provision was 
unenforceable. 
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Furthermore, even if the provisions of the origlGc< 
Decree of Divorce had not been ruled ambiguous and thereior, 
unenforceable, the trial court is not bound to a forced sa,, 
in order to effectuate a disposition of the res pect1H 
equities of the parties in any given marital asset. It is a 
well established principle that it is within the divorce 
court's prerogative to make whatever disposition of propert:, 
it deems fair, equitable and necessary for the protection aoa 
welfare of the parties; the trial court need not necessaril;' 
abide by the terms of an agreement of the parties. 
vs. Naylor, 563 P.2d 184 (1977) 
In addition, Utah Code Annotated 30-3-5 ( 1953, as 
amended), further provides that subsequent to entry of 
Decree of Divorce, the trial court has continuin, 
jurisdiction to make any subsequent changes or modificatioo 0 
with respect to the distribution of the property as may " 







where the Court 
to refuse to enforce 
This argument is further 
in Carter vs. Carter, 4> 
affirmed a 
Divorce Decree 
directing the sale of a residence and distribution of[',,_ 
various equities of the parties because of 
considerations. 
Point II 
THE DIVISION OF THE EQUITY OF THE PARTIES 
AS REFLECTED IN THE JUDGMENT WAS CLEARLY 
WITHIN THE SOUND DISCRETION OF THE TRIAL COURT 
It is a well established principle of law that the 
d1vis1on of marital property is a matter that rests largely 
within tbe sound discretion of the trial court. Pinney vs. 
Pinney, 245 P. 329. The trial court in a divorce proceeding 
considerable latitude of discretion in adjusting 
financial and property interests. The Appellant in such a 
proceeding has the burden to prove that there was a 
misunderstanding and a misapplication of the law resulting in 
substantial and prejudicial error, that the evidence 
presented clearly preponderated against the Findings of Fact, 
or that the judgment of the trial court created such a 
serious inequity as to manifest a clear abuse of discretion. 
English vs. English, 565 P. 2d 409 (1977), also cited in Pope 
vs, Pope, 589 P. 2d 752 (1978). 
The Appellant offers no rational basis or argument 
for suggesting that the trial court failed in applying any of 
the foregoing standards. The trial court made its decision 
to distribute the equity in the residence based upon the 
relative contributions of each party toward payment of the 
original mortgage principal. The contribution of each party 
was fixed, and each party shared equally in any further 
dppreciation of their investment according to their 
µercentage contribution. 
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The Appellant infers that the Respondent was aw<Hce, 
a disproportionate share of the equity in the Ii u (Jj \ 
nevertheless had the Appellant received his equity at th, 
time of the divorce, or $3, 700, and had invested that sum "· 
a financial institution at the highest rate of interest, hii 
return under that arrangement would not exceed the amouut 
awarded to him by the trial court in this proceed10.5 
Consequently, Appellant exceeds the bounds of fairness 10 
inferring that the decision of the trial court imposes au 
injustice upon him in its decision. Consequently, the 
court's award of $8,490 is clearly witbin the s ouna 
discretion of the Court and constitutes a fair and just 
return to the Appellant based upon the amount of his origioai 
equity at the time of the divorce. 
Point III 
THE TRIAL COURT ABUSED ITS DISCRETION 
IN DENYING RESPONDENT'S MOTION FOR AWARD 
TAXING ATTORNEY'S FEES AS COSTS OR FOR 
RECONSIDERATION OF JUDGMENT. 
The trial court immediately prior to 
judgment in this matter denied Respondent's Motion for 
Award Taxing Attorney's Fees as Costs or for Recons1derattc' 
of Judgment pursuant to Rule 68(b) of the Utah Rules ot Civt 
Procedure in the sum of $11,500.00. That letter was m.:;11" 
to Appellant's attorney and filed with the distr1Lt 
-8-
.,nd is part of the record in this matter. Appellant failed 
t.J accept that offer within the time allowed, and the trial 
court subsequently awarded a sum substantially less than that 
offered. 
Rule 68, in instances where an offer of judgment has 
been made and rejected by the off eree prior to trial, 
requires that costs to awarded to the offerer where a 
iudgment finally obtained is less favorable than the offer. 
The Rule specifically states that the offeree is then 
responsible for all costs incurred after the making of the 
offer. The amount recovered by the Appellant in this matter 
was substantially less than the amount offered in 
Respondent's offer of judgment. Consequently, Respondent is 
clearly entitled to an award of costs incurred subsequent to 
the date of the offer. 
Respondent seeks to have her attorney's fees incurred 
after October 21, 1982, taxed as costs to the aforementioned 
judgment. While there appears to be no specific statutory 
definition of "costs", the Utah Supreme Court in Hull vs. 
Goodman, 290 P. 2d 245, interpreted Rule 54, U.R.C.P, as 
leaving "the question of costs somewhat in the discretion of 
the courts." However, it has long been the basic rule in the 
State of Utah that "attorney's fees are not to be allowed 
unless they are provided for by contract or by statute or 
where they are a legitimate item of damages caused by the 
"ther party's wrongful act. As an extension of the latter 
proposition, we have no doubt that the statutory 
-9-
authorization to award such 'costs as may seem equitable ar,_ 
just' may include an award of attorney's fees if they we" 
necessarily incurred because of litigation which was not 
resorted to in good faith, but was merely spiteful, 
contentious or obstructive", Western Casualty & Surety Co, 
vs. Marchant, 615 P. 2d 423, 427 (1980). 
Respondent would submit that attorney's fees may be 
allowed or taxes as costs based upon statute and upon failure 
of the Appellant to exercise good faith, First, this matt" 
divorce proceeding is simply a continuation of a prior 
commenced more than fifteen years ago but never resolved. 
Attorney's fees are clearly allowable in cases of this nature 
based upon the sound discretion of the Court and upon the 
equities before it. 
Second, this matter is more particularly a partition 
proceeding wearing the "clothes" of a domestic civil case. 
Utah Code Annotated 78-39-45 ( 195 3' as amended) 
specifically provides for the payment of attorney's fees as a 
cost of partition in such proceedings. While this action 1s 
not filed as a partition proceeding, it is in essence exactly 
that situation where the owners of real property and judicia. 
assistance to resolve disputes and fix their 
equities in real property. Third, this action is 
to a quiet title action where attorney's fees may be awardeiJ 
as a measure of damages under Utah law. 
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Finally, Respondent would submit that the Appellant 
1,,s not proceeded in this case in good faith. At the trial 
ol this matter held January 12, 1983, neither Appellant nor 
bis attorney presented any reasonable or rational basis for 
his claim, presented no direct or rebuttal evidence, and 
merely argued that the real property should be sold and the 
current equity divided after allowing the Respondent 
$13,963.44 without interest. Furthermore, Appellant has 
repeatedly delayed or failed to take action to move this 
matter along in an expeditious manner. The Supreme Court 
filed its decision on November 20, 1979, remanding this case 
for an additional hearing. What should have been disposed of 
1<ithin three months has taken over three years. Respondent 
1<ould argue that Appellant's primary purpose in this delay 
was to intentionally vex, harass and annoy the Respondent, 
and cause her great concern and worry about losing her home. 
CONCLUSION 
Respondent requests that the judgment of the trial 
court be affirmed and that the issue of attorney's fees be 
remanded to the trial court for further proceedings to 
determine the amount to be taxed and awarded to Respondent as 
costs. 
Respectfully submitted, 
WYNN E. BARTHOLOMEW 
Attorney for Respondent 
and Plaintiff 
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